







3 9080 00733358 3
, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT, AND TECHNOLOGICAL
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Henry Geller, Duke University




MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
1
___________:_j_=_~ql__·lr__ _ I _ I~ I _ ~Y~I IBCI~-S~T -_ --~LlliY*II~I·---_ -~-II-. I"~=="="';r "~~"~-:-;""""~~~~~--~~~- c- - ~s~- ~ -e
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
COMMUNICATIONS FORUM
REGULATION, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT, AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Henry Geller, Duke University
Michael Marcus, M.I.T. (on leave from FCC)
November 20th, 1986
Genga Arulampalam, Rapporteur
REGULATION, SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT, & TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Henry Geller - Duke University
At the start of the presentation Geller briefly defined
the terms Allocation, Assignment, and Authorization as they fit
the topic for the day. Allocation he said, means the blocking
out of part of the radio spectrum for a particular purpose like
service functions. Assignment, in eft'ect is the nature of the
rules of the game (i.e. the rules applicable to a particular
service after an allocation has oeen made). Authorization
involves the reviewing of applications and granting specific
permission to a particular individual/organization to use that
spectrum.
Geller then discusseo tne procedural aspects of
allocation, assignment, and authorization as specified by the
Communications Act of 1934 and the Administrative Procedures Act
of 1946. In describing the process he called it "informal rule
making" - when a rule is proposed, the public is allowed to
comment orally jr in writing. However, unlike a trial, the
Agency is allowed to even go outsioe the record and gather
information. On the issue of substance, he said, the court ij
very reluctant to upset what the Agency has oone. Since it is
not the legislature, the court only rules on the aroitrariness ot
the rule. As a result of this process, judicial review of rules
is loose as to substance out tight on the procedure to be
followed. Once established, and printed in the Federal Register,
the rule takes effect in 30 days or after.
Commenting on the suostance of the legislation, Geller
noted that what was introduced in the 1920s was refined in the
1927 Act and repeated in the 1934 Act. The content is similar to
that used in many other Administrative Agency Acts, and gives the
Agency enormous leeway. This, he said, was quite desirable
particularly from the Congress' point of view, because the fields
are very dynamic, and given to rapid change.. The idea therefore
is to give the Agency a broad grant of discretion to enable it to
change quickly, in step
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ion which in this
rld uses a 9 KHz
separation. Using lower spectrum separation could yield more
space for additional channels which could in turn be used for
valuable additional broadcasting.
A further issue discussed was the technical issue of
positioning TV oroadcasting. In 1945, though the Commission
realized that it was not feasible to go ahead with VHF for
nationwide TV, it was persuaded uy RCA to go ahead with VHF.
However, UHF had the advantage that it had many outlets (70) and
allowed room for a lot more competition. It also did not
interfere with government use which was predominantly in VHF. By
1948, realizing the difficulties, the Commission froze tele isio,
grants when the number of VHF stations was only 37. But it
continued to grant licenses to earlier applicants thereby
increasing the number of stations to 108 by 1952 when it liftec
the treeze with an intermixture of VHF and UHF. Because this
mixture was soon seen not to work, everything should have been
moved to UHF. But the FCC wanted to protect the UHF Oroadcast.:D
so it failed to act. In all these decisions Geller pointed out
how the Agency, though intending to aft in the best interest ut
the puolic, was captured and pressured by the industry to make
decisions that were contrary to the public interest.
Geller next went on to describe and discuss the tnree
methods of authorization; comparative hearing, lottery, auction.
Comparative hearing is a method that has oeen used for the
longest period. However, he said that, it just does not work
because it is impossible to review and decide comparative merits
on the basis of each claimant's proposal. The lottery system ni,
oeen used since the early 1980s. Though it is better than
comparative hearing, it tends to act more like a sweepstake -
atL.racting a lot of people (even some who don't have any genuine
interest in the facility except that of cashing in on the demand)
who subsequently sell-out to the highest bidder. In this context
he cited Metromedia which won the permit for cellular systems and
eventually sold out to Southwestern Bell for about $1.2 billion.
Auction, he said, is by far the best method where the market
decides the winner. The funds recovered could also be put to
good public use. However, despite repeated requests Congress, he
said, has yet not got around to granting its approval for the use
of the auction method.
Geller then turned his attention to other issues
related to spectrum management. Firstly, he discussed the dual
allocation process that operates under the existing system. The
FCC is authorized to allocate spectrum and so is the President
(for Defense and similar purposes). As a result, both have to
work together and spectrum has to be shared. In practice tnis
sharing, he said, becomes rather difficult particularly because
of the large clout wielded by the Defense Department (DOD). For,
the efficient use of spectrum by the DOD cannot under this dual
system be monitored and compared with the puolic use of spectrum.
As a result, spectrum tends to be less efficiently utilized in
defense than in public use. As a solution to this problem Geller
suggested the establishing of a single entity, like a Department
of Communication as is the case in Canada, the chief of which
shoulf be appointed oy the President. Such an institution would
be responsible for the allocation of spectrum for defense as well
as public use.
Another issue he touched on briefly was the free of
charge allocation of spectrum which eliminated the incentive for
more efficient use of spectrum. He suggested the importance of
chis problem and added that the second speaker (Marcus) would
comment on it further. An additional issue that Geller commented
on was that of technical standards. The dilemma here, he saio,
is whether a standard should be specified or allowed to go to the
market for selection. The problem in specifying is that the
government is liable not to do it well, and once it is done tIe
users will be stuck with it. In situations where there is no
difference between the various options (e.g. teletext) the Agency
could just select one at random. However, if technology is
changing rapidly it would be best to let the market decide on a
stanOard.
Finally, Geller discussed the need for more
flexibility. Rule making, he said, causes significant delays
which adversely affect the introduction of new technology. In
this regard he compared the area of communications with computer
technology. In the latter field, one can go to the market witn d
new product without any delays thus capitalizing on the special
features of the procuct. However, he said, in the area of
telecommunications "the secret of the new product is blown" wnil-
going through the whole process of obtaining permission. As a
result, the inventor of the new product/ process often is unaole
to max-imize the benefit of first entry to the market. As a
solution to this problem Geller suggested a form of experimental
licensing and/or experimental frequencies to be to be utilized
for the introduction of new products.
In closing, he commented that in the fast approaching
information age the computer field is making rapid progress.
However, he said, regulations the way they are at present
restrict the use of telecommunication channels which are
necessary as a support system to this advancement in the computer
field.
Michael Marcus - MIT (on leave from FCC)
Marcus at the start of his presentation asserted that
the classical regulation of telecommunication in this country
over the past 50 years may have hao an inhibiting effect on
technological advancement. This impact on innovation may be
seen, he said, in three different areas:
- Evolution of existing radio systems
- brand new uses of radio
- non-radio systems involved in telephone companies
Traditionally, he said, FCC technical rules/standards
have been prescriptive in nature. The history of tnis, he said,
goes back to the time the FCC was started in 1934 when there were
very few technical options available for building radio systems.
FM was brand new at that time and AM was essentially the only
modulation that was well known. Also, in 1946, following the
introduction of tne Admistrative Procedure Act, Congress set up
one set of standards (tor rule making) applicable to all 200
regulatory agencies.
As an example of the difficulty of prescriptive rules
Marcus showed a slide of the FCC rules dealing with TV
broadcasting right from its inception. In it he pointed out the
14 amendments made to the rule over the 20 year period 1963-1983.
As technology developed, every time an improvement came about for
TV oroadcasting the rules had to be changed following the long
drawn out rule making proceOure. The question, he said, that
arises is what benefit accrues to the government from going
through this whole process of rule making. Why not let the
broadcasters decide provided they don't interfere with each
other?
Marcus discussed the need for rule making action in
relation to new technology including existing licensees. In this
context he described the approach adopted by tne Agency with
regard to developing appropriate rules for such new technologies
as FM subcarriers, AM stereo, AM digital subcarriers, and digitil
land mobile terminals. The problem, he said, in all four of
these examples is that the existing licensee is delayed by tne
inaction or slow action of the Agency. He pointed out however,
that the Agency had become a lot more responsive to these neeas
over the last three to four years. As for rule making with
regard to completely new innovations tne situation, he said, is
lot more complicated. As an example he cited the system calle-c
XTEN, a digital termination service developed by Xerox. Xerox,
he said, ootainled approval in record time (1 1/2 years).
However, it cost them legal fees in the region of $0.5 - $1.U
million. Unfortunately this degree of financing is not availaole
to many smaller innovators. A smaller company cited by Marcus
was LO-JACK which developed a car theft system for police
identification. They succeeded in obtaining an interim spectrum
allocation by negotiating with the FBI to use one of its spare
frequencies. As a result, they effectively bypassed the FCC.
Discussing the problems faced by innovators, he highlighted Lhe
difficulty smaller new businesses had in raising adequate
finance for this environment.
An additional factor faced by radio technology
companies is the risk faced by the company in that the governmt'
can cancel/withdraw experimental licenses overnight without the
right of appeal. This not only inhibits investors but als<f
threatens potential customers.
Generally, he said, there is great difficulty in usin,
administrative rule making to resolve issues relating to
technical stancaros - especially in contentious cases. In
addition, the lack of predictable market access may tend to
aiscourage capital formation, and research and development.
Further, user design decisions could be restricted, from an
efficiency point of view, oy the relevant apparent value of
spectrum and radio hardware. Marcus quoted from a 1959 article
by Prof. Coase recommending the use of market price mechanisms
for eficient spectrum allocation, and noted that there had Deen
little progress in this regard in the intervening period of
almost three decades. He added that while the optimum way to
find spectrum space for a new use might be to improve the
efficiency of existing users that have low efficiency and low
marginal improvement costs, there is no present mechanism to do
this
Moving onto telephone and common carriers, Marcus
stated that the structural constraints that exist are based on
technology as at present, with reasonable projections for the
future. In addition, there is a general reluctance to change
rules unless there is clear indication that technology has
changed. However, the other side of the coin is that companies
like AT&T or the Bell Operating Companies are reluctant to
experiment with field trials since waivers are time consuming and
require detailed technical disclosures. He cited the field trial
example of the Elie Experiment in Canada where normal twisteu
wire was replaced with fioer optic cable. Similar experiments
were conducted in some West European countries (including the UK)
but not in the US, most probaoly he said, due in great part to
regulatory barriers.
Finally, Marcus addressed the issue of what could be
done to alleviate the problems mentioned earlier. He suggesteo
that existing licensees be granted technical flexibility to use
the allocated facility for any purpose that fits the general
criteria of the original allocation. With regard to spectrum
allocation, he suggested that granting licensees property rignts
would not only allow technical flexibility but also provide for
greater efficiency. He further highlighted the need for a
coupling of engineering research and telecommunications policy in
order to achieve coordinated and effective end results.
Speakers' Comments and Answers to Questions
Geller emphasized once again that spectrum allocation
is the backbone and most important part of spectrum management.
He added that greater efficiencies should be sought in spectrum
allocation and use. He identified as a basic problem the current
system which required radical change to be effective. He
lamented that the "expert agency" had really become a dumping
ground with too few technologists and economists but rather it is
dominated by lawyers and bureaucrats. Marcus added that the
problem in the FCC may be the political nature of much of its
jurisdiction. He cited as an alternative example the Canaoian
communication regulatory system which distinctly separates
political and technical issues. Geller further added that unli~e
the SEC and the Federal Reserve (which have technically qualifleJ
people) tne FCC is burcened with disappointed Congressmen etc.
who stay with the Agency for a few years and then go into the
industry. As a result, they don't like to antagonize the
industry with rulings that aoversely affect it. He also
communicated his pessimism about the possibility of changes to
the current system because ne said, it appears to be the inoustry
that "calls the tune."
A member of the aucience commented that a possible
reason for delayed rule making is the rapid advance of
technology. As a result, he said, it may be better to sit Oack
and wait instead of locking into something that will not work r~c
well in the future. Marcus cited the example of the VCR where
the original Betamax is different from VHS or the current
Betamax. If the government had fixed a standard, he said, in the
early days of VCR we would have been stuck with the original
Betamax. Geller added that one has to look at the situation and
judge whether technology is moving fast or not and then act
accordingly. The oest course of action, he said, is to let the
market decide.
A comment was made that the presentations gave a bleak
picture of the FCC with the Agency functioning merely as a
"registry". The question was asked as to where the FCC was
headed and to what kind of future. Marcus responding said that
the FCC is needed particularly to handle spectrum allocation.
However, he suggested that in about half a century the system
might be deregulated altogether.
